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Abstract 
What are the effects of financial market imperfections on unemployment and vacancies in 
Canada? The author estimates the model of Zhang (2011) – a standard monetary dynamic 
stochastic general-equilibrium model augmented with explicit financial and labour 
market frictions – with Canadian data for the period 1984Q2–2010Q4, and uses it to 
examine the importance of financial shocks on labour market fluctuations in Canada. She 
finds that the estimated value of the elasticity of external finance, the key parameter 
capturing financial frictions, is much higher than the value suggested in the literature. 
This gives rise to a larger amplification effect from the financial accelerator mechanism, 
which helps the model generate a more volatile labour market. The author finds that the 
model accounts well for the cyclical behaviour of unemployment and vacancies observed 
in the data. She also finds that financial shocks are one of the main sources of 
fluctuations in the Canadian labour market. Overall, financial shocks contribute about   
30 per cent of the fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies for the Canadian 
economy. 
JEL classification: E32, E44, J6  
Bank classification: Economic models; Financial markets; Labour markets 
Résumé 
Quels effets les imperfections des marchés financiers ont-elles sur le chômage et l’offre 
d’emplois au Canada? À l’aide de données canadiennes allant du deuxième trimestre de 
1984 au quatrième trimestre de 2010, l’auteure estime un modèle monétaire d’équilibre 
général dynamique et stochastique intégrant des frictions financières et un marché du 
travail soumis à des frictions – tiré de Zhang (2011) – afin d’examiner le rôle des chocs 
financiers dans les fluctuations du marché canadien du travail. La valeur qu’elle obtient 
pour l’élasticité du financement extérieur, le principal paramètre qui rend compte des 
frictions financières, est beaucoup plus élevée que celle avancée dans la littérature. Cette 
forte élasticité accentue l’effet d’accélérateur financier, le modèle générant ainsi plus de 
volatilité sur le marché du travail. L’auteure constate que le modèle reproduit bien le 
comportement cyclique du chômage et de l’offre d’emplois observé dans les données. 
D’après ses résultats, les chocs financiers sont l’une des grandes sources des variations 
sur le marché canadien du travail. Au total, ils expliquent environ 30 % des fluctuations 
du chômage et de l’offre d’emplois dans l’économie. 
Classification JEL : E32, E44, J6 
Classification de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Marchés financiers; Marchés du 
travail 1 Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial crisis has been associated with a signiﬁcant rise in the unemployment rates
in both the United States and Canada. In the United States, the unemployment rate more than dou-
bled from 4.8 per cent at the beginning of the recession to peak around 10 per cent in the last quarter
of 2009. In Canada, the unemployment rate rose from 6 per cent in the last quarter of 2007 to peak
at 8.5 per cent in the third quarter of 2009. A recent paper by Zhang (2011) develops and estimates
a quantitative macroeconomic model that incorporates both labour and ﬁnancial market frictions
using U.S. time-series data from 1964Q1 to 2010Q3. She ﬁnds that the ﬁnancial accelerator mech-
anism plays an important role in amplifying the effects of the ﬁnancial shock on unemployment.
Overall, the ﬁnancial shock contributes around 37 per cent of the ﬂuctuations in unemployment and
vacancies in the U.S. economy.
This paper considers the Canadian case and asks: How much of the ﬂuctuations in unemploy-
ment and vacancies in the Canadian economy can be attributed to ﬁnancial factors; i.e., ﬁnancial
frictions and shocks? Although the recent literature has shown an increasing interest in the role of
ﬁnancial factors in business cycle ﬂuctuations in medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) models (e.g., Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999; Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
2007), it has largely abstracted from modelling unemployment in models where ﬁnancial factors
play an important role. Zhang (2011) and Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2007) are two recent
exceptions.1 Both papers model ﬁnancial market frictions as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999), and use a search and matching framework to model labour market frictions. In particular,
both papers use the staggered wage contracting in Gertler and Trigari (2009) to model wage-setting
frictions.2 The key difference between Zhang (2011) and Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2007)
is that Zhang (2011) focuses on the transmission mechanism of ﬁnancial shocks to labour mar-
ket activities. In particular, Zhang (2011) highlights the important role of the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism in amplifying the responses in unemployment and vacancies to ﬁnancial shocks.
I start the analysis by reviewing some stylized facts about the Canadian labour market. I show
that the dynamics of the Canadian labour market are similar to those observed in the United States.
That is, over the cycle, while real wages are relatively rigid, both unemployment and vacancies are
more volatile relative to output: unemployment is 5 times more volatile than output, and vacancies
are 8 times more. To determine the extent to which ﬁnancial market frictions may have contributed
to ﬂuctuations in the Canadian labour market, I estimate the model in Zhang (2011) using Canadian
data from 1984Q2 to 2010Q4.3 In the model, unemployment rises after a negative ﬁnancial shock.
1A number of studies have incorporated labour market frictions into the standard New Keynesian models; however,
ﬁnancial market frictions have not been considered in these models. For examples of the representative studies, see
Walsh (2005); Trigari (2009); Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007). For examples of the most recent developments in this
research area, see Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008); Gal´ ı, Smets and Wouters (2010); Ravenna and Walsh (2011).
2Since the staggered wage contracting in Gertler and Trigari (2009) does not have a direct impact on ongoing
worker-employer relations, it is not vulnerable to the Barro (1977) critique of sticky wages.
3Zhang (2011) uses a closed-economy model. Although Canada is a small open economy, using a closed-economy
framework is still a useful exercise to generate implications for issues that do not particularly require an open-economyThe intuition is as follows: a negative ﬁnancial shock reduces the entrepreneurs’ net worth and
worsens their balance-sheet position. Given the ﬁnancial frictions in the model, the entrepreneurs
will face a higher risk premium on their external ﬁnance due to the deterioration of their balance-
sheet position. Since external ﬁnancing becomes more costly, the demand for capital declines. It is
optimal for entrepreneurs to keep a constant capital labour ratio given the constant-return-to-scale
aggregate production function. Thus, the demand for labour declines as well, leading ﬁrms to post
fewer vacancies. The labour market becomes less tight and the likelihood of a worker ﬁnding a job
decreases, leading to a rise in unemployment. Furthermore, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in
the model ampliﬁes the ﬁnancial shock, leading to even larger ﬂuctuations in unemployment and
vacancies in the labour market.
As in Zhang (2011), I ﬁnd that the estimated value for the elasticity of external ﬁnance, the key
parameter capturing ﬁnancial frictions, is much higher than the value suggested in the literature.
This results in a larger ampliﬁcation effect from the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, which helps
the model generate a more volatile labour market. Similar to the results in Zhang (2011) for the
U.S. economy, I ﬁnd that the model matches the aggregate volatility in the data for the Canadian
economy reasonably well. In particular, the model is able to generate highly volatile unemployment
and vacancies, and a relatively rigid real wage. The results suggest that ﬁnancial shock is one
of the main sources of ﬂuctuations in the Canadian labour market: approximately 30 per cent of
the variability in unemployment and vacancies can be attributed to ﬁnancial shock. To further
identify the role of ﬁnancial factors (ﬁnancial frictions and shocks) in the labour market ﬂuctuations,
I exclude the ﬁnancial shock and re-estimate the model without using any ﬁnancial data. I ﬁnd that
the estimated degree of ﬁnancial market frictions is much lower, and the model accounts poorly for
the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I document the cyclical features of the
Canadian labour market. In section 3, I describe the model, and in section 4 I discuss the data and
estimation strategy. In section 5, I present the estimation results and discuss the effects of ﬁnancial
shocks and frictions on the Canadian labour market. In section 6, I conduct robustness checks. In
section 7 I offer some concluding remarks.
2 CyclicalBehaviourofUnemploymentandVacanciesinCanada
In this section, I brieﬂy document the movements of the main variables in the Canadian labour
market: unemployment, job vacancies and real wages. Most of the data are taken from Statistics
Canada. The unemployment rate is deﬁned as the fraction of the population in the labour force
who are able to work, actively seeking jobs, and yet not working. For vacancies, the conventional
measure is the help-wanted index from ads in major newspapers. Statistics Canada’s help-wanted
index covers the period from 1981 to 2003. However, ﬁrms rely increasingly on the Internet to
structure. For example, Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2001) argue that, under certain conditions, the optimal monetary
policy design problem for a small open economy is isomorphic to that for a closed economy. For recent examples of
using a closed-economy DSGE model for the Canadian economy, see Dib (2003), and Covas and Zhang (2010).
2post their vacancies, and Statistics Canada stopped compiling the help-wanted index in 2003 as
it became less useful. Currently, the only available data for the help-wanted index are from the
Conference Board of Canada. Their help-wanted index is based on the seasonally adjusted number
of new, unduplicated jobs posted online during the month across 79 Canadian job-posting websites.
Therefore, in this paper, the vacancy data from 1984Q2 to 2003Q1 are from Statistics Canada, and
the data from 2005Q4 to 2010Q3 are from the Conference Board of Canada.4 For real wages, I use
hourly total compensation for the business sector. All the series are logged and detrended using a
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.
Figure 1 shows the cyclical components of unemployment, vacancies and real wages. Output is
added for comparison.5 Compared to output, unemployment and vacancies are much more volatile,
while real wages are relatively rigid. Unemployment and vacancies are negatively correlated: un-
employment is countercyclical, while vacancies are procyclical. Table 1 quantiﬁes what is evident
in Figure 1. The ﬁrst row of Table 1 reports the relative standard deviations (compared to output) of
the key labour market variables. Unemployment is 5 times more volatile than output, vacancies are
8 times more, and the volatility of real wages is slightly less than that of output. The lower panel in
Table 1 provides the correlation matrix. Vacancies are procyclical with a correlation coefﬁcient of
0.87, while unemployment is countercyclical with a correlation coefﬁcient of -0.85. The correlation
coefﬁcient for real wages and output is 0.03, suggesting that wages are acyclical. The data also
show that unemployment and vacancies are negatively correlated with a correlation coefﬁcient of
-0.85.6
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Quarterly Data, Canada, 1984–2010
y w v u
Standard deviation 1 0.88 9.65 5.59
Correlation matrix y 1 0.03 0.87 -0.85
w - 1 -0.27 0.03
v - - 1 -0.85
u - - - 1
3 The Model
Since the model is taken from Zhang (2011), in this section I provide only an overview of the
model. Zhang (2011) considers an economy populated by a representative household, retailers,
entrepreneurs, capital producers and employment agencies. In addition, there is a government in
4Note that there are no vacancy data available between 2003Q2 and 2005Q3.
5Output is measured by real GDP, which is also logged and detrended using an HP ﬁlter with the smoothing param-
eter set to 1600.
6Table 1 is based on the data from 1984 to 2010. However, the values related to vacancies (the standard deviation of
vacancies, the correlation coefﬁcient of vacancy and output, vacancy and unemployment, and vacancy and real wages)
are computed using data from 1984–2003.
3the model that balances the budget, and a central bank that implements a simple interest rate rule.
In what follows, I brieﬂy describe the role of each agent in the model.
3.1 Household
Each member in the household consumes, holds nominal bonds Bt, receives dividends from retail-
ers t, and pays taxes Tt. At time t, a fraction of household members are employed (nt), and a
fraction of household members are unemployed (ut = 1 nt). The employed family members earn
nominal wages wn
t . The unemployed members receive unemployment beneﬁts  bt. Following An-
dolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), family members are assumed to be perfectly insured against the
risk of being unemployed, and thus consumption is the same for each family member. The budget











t is determined by Nash bargaining between employment agencies and workers, and the
labour supply nt is determined by a search and match process.




















where et is a preference shock that follows








Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and have a ﬁnite
life. At each period t, entrepreneurs use capital and labour services to produce wholesale goods by
usingaCobb-Douglastechnology. Entrepreneurspurchasecapitalatpriceqt fromcapitalproducers,
using both the entrepreneurs’ own net worth and bank loans. Entrepreneurs experience idiosyncratic
shocks, which can lead them to default; however, only entrepreneurs observe the realization of the
idiosyncraticshocks. Giventhisasymmetricinformationproblembetweenentrepreneursandbanks,
the optimal loan contract in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) is such that entrepreneurs pay a
risk premium on loans. This external ﬁnance premium, s(:), depends on an entrepreneur’s balance-








0(:) > 0 and s(1) = 1, kt+1 is capital demand for the entrepreneur sector, and Nt+1 is
its net worth. Equation (2) expresses that the external ﬁnance premium increases with leverage, or
decreaseswiththeshareofanentrepreneur’scapitalinvestmentthatisﬁnancedbytheentrepreneur’s
own net worth.
Given the ﬁnancial market imperfections, the aggregate capital is determined by the aggregate







kt+1 + qt+1(1   )]
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where e is the survival rate of entrepreneurs. The aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs at the end
of period t, Nt+1, is the sum of equity held by entrepreneurs surviving from period t   1. t is
a ﬁnancial wealth shock, an exogenous shock to the survival probability of entrepreneurs, which
follows an AR(1) process:







The aggregate demand for labour services is relatively simple. Given that the aggregate production




the aggregate labour demand equation can be written as
p
w






where lt is the labour services supplied by employment agencies, (1   )
yt
lt is the marginal product
of labour services, pw
t is the relative price for wholesale goods and pl
t is the relative price for labour
services.
53.3 Employment agencies
Employment agencies act as intermediaries between the representative household (who supply
labour) and entrepreneurs (who demand labour). The labour market is modelled using a standard
search model. On the one hand, the employment agencies post vacancies, bargaining wages with
workers; on the other hand, these agencies combine labour supplied by households into homoge-
neous labour services nt =
R
nt(i)di and supply them to entrepreneurs at a competitive price pl
t.
This leaves the equilibrium conditions associated with the production of wholesale goods unaf-
fected, even though the labour market is frictional.
The basic model features of the employment agencies are as follows. At the beginning of pe-
riod t, each employment agency i posts vt(i) vacancies to attract new workers, and employs nt(i)





nt(i)di: The number of unemployed workers at the beginning of period t is
ut = 1   nt:







For an employment agency, the value of adding another worker at time t is the price of selling one
unit of labour service pl
t, minus the wage cost
wn
t (i)
pt and vacancy costs 
2xt(i)2, plus the continuation











2 + ( + xt(i))Ett;t+1Jt+1(i);
where xt(i) is the hiring rate for employment agency i, and  is the probability of a match that
survives to the next period. The value of employment for a new worker at employment agency i at
time t, Vt(i); is
Vt(i) = wt(i) + Ett;t+1[Vt+1(i) + (1   )Ut+1];
where wt(i) is the real wage. The value of unemployment, Ut is
Ut =  b + Ett;t+1[s
l
t+1Vt+1 + (1   s
l
t+1)Ut+1];
where  b is the unemployment beneﬁt, sl
t+1 is the probability of being employed versus unemployed
next period, and Vt is the average value of employment for a new worker at time t.7 The workers’
surplus for having a job at employment agency i; Ht(i), is
Ht(i) = Vt(i)   Ut:
7See Gertler and Trigari (2009) for details about the average value of employment.
6Employment agencies and workers negotiate a nominal wage wn
t (i) to maximize the joint product
of the workers’ surplus Ht(i) and the employment agencies’ surplus Jt(i). However, every period,
each employment agency has only a ﬁxed probability 1    to negotiate with workers. Thus, the







t (i) = w
n
t with probability 1   
= w
n
t 1 with probability ;
where  is the steady-state inﬂation rate. The equation for the real wage w
















opportunity cost. These are conventional components for Nash bargaining solutions for wages. The
third term is from the staggered multi-period contracting. Finally, the aggregate real wage wt can
be expressed as







Capital production is assumed to be subject to an investment-speciﬁc shock, t. Capital producers
purchase the ﬁnal goods from retailers as investment goods, it, and produce efﬁcient investment
goods, tit, where t follows







Capital producers are also subject to a quadratic capital adjustment cost,

2( it
kt  )2kt. The proﬁt of

















Retailers buy wholesale goods from entrepreneurs and produce a good of variety j. Let yt(j) be the
retail good sold by retailer j to households and let pt(j) be its nominal price. The ﬁnal good, yt, is



















Following Calvo (1983), in each period, only a fraction 1  of retailers reset their prices, while the
remaining retailers keep their prices unchanged. The retailer chooses pt(j) to maximize its expected













where mct is the real marginal cost, which is the price of wholesale goods relative to the price of
ﬁnal goods (pw;t=pt), and 
p
t;i  ict+i=ct is the stochastic discount factor. Let p
t be the optimal



















The aggregate price evolves according to:
pt = [p
1 "







The government is assumed to balance its budget,
gt = Tt;
where gt follows an AR(1) process,







3.7 Monetary policy rules
The central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate rn



















8where rn,  and y are the steady-state values of rn
t , t and yt, and "m





, y and r are policy coefﬁcients chosen by the central bank.
3.8 Aggregation and equilibrium






















As in Zhang (2011), I use a Bayesian approach to estimate the model. However, before using
the model with the data, some parameters need to be calibrated to match the salient features of
the Canadian economy. Table 2 reports these parameters and their calibrated values. Among the 13
parameterslistedinTable2, sixrelatetothelabourmarket, tworelatetotheﬁnancialmarket, andthe
rest are “conventional” preference and technology parameters. As in Zhang (2011), I use standard
values in the literature for the conventional parameters. The discount factor  is set to 0:99, which
corresponds to an annual real interest rate in the steady state at 4 per cent. The curvature parameter
in the utility function, , is set to 2, implying an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.5. The
steady-state depreciation rate, , is set to 0:025, which implies an annual rate of depreciation of
10 per cent. The parameter of the Cobb-Douglas function, , is set to 1=3. The steady-state price
markup "=("   1) is set to 1:1 by setting " = 11.
For the labour market parameters, following Zhang (2011), the bargaining power parameter, ;
is set to 0.5, which is commonly used in the literature. The elasticity of matches to unemployment,
m; is set to 0.5, the midpoint of values typically used. Following the suggestion of Zhang (2008),
the job-separation rate, 1   , is set to 0.09, matching the average job duration of 2.8 years in
Canada; the job-ﬁnding rate sl is set to 0.927, matching the fact that one-third of the unemployed
workers ﬁnd jobs within one month. Following Zhang (2008), the mean of market tightness is
normalized to 1, which implies that the value of m in the matching function equals the quarterly
job-ﬁnding rate. Following Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008), I express  b, the steady-state ﬂow value
of unemployment, as






where ~ b is the fraction of the worker’s contribution to the job. Following Shimer (2005), I set ~ b to
90.4.
The survival rate of entrepreneurs, e, and the steady-state ratio of the net worth to capital N=k,
are two ﬁnancial market parameters. I set e = 0:9865 so that the steady-state external risk premium
is 138 basis points, which is the sample average spread between the prime lending rate and overnight
rate in Canada. I also set N=k to 0.6, which is suggested by Covas and Zhang (2010). In calibration,







where  is the elasticity of the external risk premium with respect to leverage and  > 0.  can be
viewed as a “reduced-form” parameter capturing ﬁnancial market frictions.
Table 2: Calibrated Values
Conventional parameters
 discount factor 0.99
 inverse of intertemporal substitution of consumption 2
 capital share 0.33
 capital depreciation rate 0.025
" intermediate-good elasticity of substitution 11
Financial market parameters
N=k steady-state ratio of net worth to capital 0.6
e survivor rate of entrepreneurs 0.987
Labour market parameters
 survival rate of ﬁrms 0.91
sl job-ﬁnding rate 0.927
ql job-ﬁlling rate 0.927
 bargaining power of workers 0.5
~ b parameter for unemployment ﬂow value 0.4
m elasticity in matches to unemployment 0.5
4.2 Data and priors
I use Bayesian techniques to estimate the remaining parameters. There are seven behavioural pa-
rameters: the elasticity of the external risk premium ; the capital adjustment cost parameter ; the
Calvo price and wage parameters  and ; and the Taylor rule parameters , y and r. I also
estimate the ﬁrst-order autocorrelations of all the exogenous shocks and their respective standard
deviations. I follow Zhang (2011) when choosing priors, which are reported in Tables 3 and 4.8
The data sample spans from 1984Q2 to 2010Q4, and includes six series of quarterly Canadian
data: output, consumption, investment, nominal interest rate, inﬂation and external ﬁnance cost.
8For a detailed discussion of prior distributions, see Zhang (2011).
10Output is measured by real GDP. Consumption is measured by real expenditures of non-durable
goods. Investment is measured by the sum of business gross ﬁxed capital formation, investment in
inventories and real expenditure of durable goods. Data on these real variables are expressed in per
capita terms using the civilian population aged 15 and up. The nominal interest rate is measured by
the overnight rate in quarterly terms. Inﬂation is the quarter-to-quarter growth rate of the core CPI.
External ﬁnance costs are measured by business prime lending rates in real terms. All the series are
detrended using an HP ﬁlter with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.
Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters: Baseline
Prior Posterior distribution
distribution Mode Mean 5% 95%
Risk premium elasticity  gamma (0.05,0.02) 0.188 0.195 0.156 0.228
Calvo wage parameter  beta (0.67, 0.05) 0.850 0.847 0.819 0.873
Calvo price parameter  beta (0.67, 0.05) 0.571 0.569 0.497 0.639
Capital adj. cost parameter  norm (0.25, 0.05) 0.222 0.224 0.142 0.300
Taylor rule inertia r beta (0.75, 0.1) 0.424 0.425 0.315 0.523
Taylor rule inﬂation  gamma (1.5, 0.1) 1.72 1.75 1.602 1.886
Taylor rule output gap y norm (0.125, 0.15) 0.001 0.004 -0.022 0.028
Table 4: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Shock Parameters: Baseline
Prior Posterior distribution
distribution Mode Mean 5% 95%
Panel A: Autoregressive parameters
Technology z beta (0.6,0.2) 0.869 0.864 0.818 0.911
Preference e beta (0.6,0.2) 0.484 0.497 0.377 0.639
Investment  beta (0.6,0.2) 0.884 0.877 0.847 0.913
Government g beta (0.6,0.2) 0.589 0.602 0.500 0.704
Financial  beta (0.6,0.2) 0.422 0.397 0.146 0.598
Panel B: Standard deviations
Technology z invg (0.005,2) 0.57 0.58 0.52 0.64
Monetary m invg (0.005,2) 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.32
Investment  invg (0.005,2) 2.16 2.13 1.58 2.70
Preference e invg (0.005,2) 1.22 1.26 1.09 1.44
Government g invg (0.005,2) 1.44 1.45 1.31 1.60
Financial  invg (0.005,2) 0.34 0.36 0.27 0.46
115 Results
5.1 Estimates
Table 3 reports the mode, the mean and the 5 and 95 percentiles of the posterior distribution of the
behavioural parameters. The risk premium elasticity parameter, , is estimated to be around 0.19
(mean 0.195, mode 0.188). This value is lower than 0.24, the estimated value for  for the U.S.
economy in Zhang (2011),9 but much higher than 0.05 – the value that is typically calibrated in the
literature – or the estimates in other related studies.10 As suggested in Zhang (2011), the high value
of  might be due to the inclusion of the ﬁnancial data and ﬁnancial shock. In other words, the
non-ﬁnancial variables used in the estimation in the other studies contain very limited information
on ﬁnancial frictions, and therefore they underestimate . The Calvo wage contract parameter, , is
estimated to be around 0.85, suggesting a mean of six-and-a-half quarters between wage contracting
periods. This value is higher than the estimate of the same parameter in Zhang (2011), suggesting a
higher wage rigidity in Canada compared to the United States. The degree of price stickiness, , is
estimated to be 0.57, which implies an average price-adjustment duration of 2.3 quarters. This value
is also higher than its counterpart for the U.S. economy, suggesting that the price rigidity is slightly
higher in Canada. The capital adjustment cost parameter, , is estimated to be around 0.22. For the
monetary policy reaction function parameters,  (the Taylor rule inﬂation parameter) is estimated
to be 1.75, and the reaction coefﬁcient to the output gap, y; is estimated to be 0.004, suggesting
that policy responds very little to the output gap. There is a relatively low degree of interest rate
smoothing, since the coefﬁcient on the lagged interest rate is estimated to be 0.42. Compared to
the estimated rule for the U.S.economy in Zhang (2011), this estimated Taylor rule suggests that,
in Canada, the degree of inertia in the policy rate is higher, and the policy rate responds to inﬂation
slightly more aggressively.11
Table 4 reports the estimates of the shock processes. The results are consistent with the ﬁndings
in Zhang (2011), although the exact magnitude of the persistence and volatility of the shocks differs
for these two countries: the new shock, a ﬁnancial wealth shock, appears to be the least persistent
shock, with an AR(1) coefﬁcient of 0.39. The technology and investment shocks are estimated to
be most persistent, with a coefﬁcient of 0.86 and 0.88, respectively. The mean of the standard error
of the shock to investment is 2.13, suggesting that it is the most volatile shock. In contrast, the
standard deviation of the ﬁnancial shock is relatively low at 0.36.
9See Tables D1 and D2 in Appendix D for Zhang’s (2011) estimation results for the United States.
10For example: for the U.S. economy, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (2000)
calibrate  at 0.05; Christensen and Dib (2008) and Queijo von Heideken (2009) estimate  at 0.04; and De Graeve
(2008) estimates  at 0.1. For the Canadian economy, Covas and Zhang (2010) estimate  at 0.04.
11Since the sample period in Zhang (2011) is from 1964Q1 to 2010Q3, a portion of the differences in estimates
between Canada and the United States could be the result of different sample periods. Indeed, Zhang (2011) also
estimates the model for the United States for the period from 1984Q1 to 2010Q3. The estimates from this later period
are closer to the Canadian counterpart, although the differences remain.
125.2 Fit of the model
Table 5 compares the standard deviations of the key variables in the model against the data. Overall,
the model does a good job of matching the Canadian economy. The model performs particularly
well in matching the volatility in investment, real wages and inﬂation. Moreover, the model is
able to capture some stylized facts of the Canadian labour market: real wages are rigid, but both
unemploymentandvacanciesarehighlyvolatile. Forﬁnancialvariables, themodelisabletocapture
50 per cent of the relative volatility in the external ﬁnance cost fc:
Table 5: Relative Standard Deviations: Model vs. Data
y c i w v u rn  fc
Data 1 0.53 3.93 0.88 9.65 5.59 0.18 0.17 0.29
Baseline 1 0.72 4.28 0.84 16.02 13.25 0.29 0.19 0.16
Given that studying the Canadian labour market is the focus of this paper, I also report the
correlation matrix of the key labour market variables generated by the model in Table 6. The model
does very well in matching the correlation between output and unemployment: -0.84 in the model
and -0.85 in the data. The model also does relatively well in matching the correlations between
output and vacancies: 0.76 in the model and 0.87 in the data. Moreover, the model is able to
capture the strong negative relationship between unemployment and vacancies observed in the data,
although the predicted value of the correlation coefﬁcient, -0.97, is higher than that in the data.
However, the model has some difﬁculties in matching the correlations between wages and the other
variables.
Table 6: Correlation Coefﬁcients of the Key Labour Market Variables: Model
y w v u
y 1 -0.27 0.76 -0.84
(0.03) (0.87) (-0.85)
w - 1 -0.82 0.73
(-0.27) (0.03)
v - - 1 -0.97
(-0.85)
u - - - 1
5.3 Sources of Canadian labour market ﬂuctuations
Zhang (2011) shows that ﬁnancial shocks are the most important shocks determining the variations
in unemployment and vacancies for the U.S. economy. They account for 37 per cent of the varia-
tions in these two variables. To assess the contribution of ﬁnancial shocks to the variations in the
13key labour market variables for the Canadian economy, I conduct a similar exercise. Given the
estimation results of the shock processes, I simulate the model to examine the contribution of each
shock to the variations in these variables. Table 7 shows the results. The investment-speciﬁc shock
appears to be the most important shock, accounting for 50 per cent of the variations in unemploy-
ment and vacancies, and 41 per cent of the variations in real wages. The ﬁnancial shock is next in
importance, accounting for roughly 30 per cent of the variations in unemployment and vacancies,
and 29 per cent in real wages. The technology shock is in third place, explaining 14 per cent of the
ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies, and 22 per cent in real wages.
Table 7: Variance Decomposition of the Key Labour Market Variables
Technology Monetary Financial Investment Preference Government
u 13.9 2.1 30.5 50.1 0.4 3.1
v 13.9 2.2 30.7 49.7 0.4 3.1
w 22.6 3.3 29.6 41.4 0.4 2.7
y 15.7 1.7 30.4 49.9 0.3 2.0
 11.8 15.7 30.2 38.3 0.5 3.5
To assess the contribution of ﬁnancial shocks to the overall economy, I also report the variance
decomposition of output and inﬂation in the last two rows of Table 7. Overall, the ﬁnancial shock
accounts for 30 per cent of the variations in both output and inﬂation.
5.4 Effects of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism on the Canadian labour
market
5.4.1 Model dynamics after a ﬁnancial shock
Estimation results show that the ﬁnancial shock is the least persistent among the six shocks, and has
a low standard deviation; however, variance decomposition suggests that 30 per cent of the variation
in unemployment and vacancies can be accounted for by the ﬁnancial shock. This implies that the
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism might have played an important role in amplifying the shock. In
this section, I ﬁrst show the responses of the key labour market variables to the ﬁnancial shock, and
then I simulate the model to show how the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism ampliﬁes the shock.
Figure 2 shows the model dynamics after a negative ﬁnancial shock. After the shock, the number
of vacancies declines and the unemployment rate rises. This is because a negative ﬁnancial wealth
shock reduces the survivor rate of entrepreneurs, leading the aggregate net worth to fall. This
pushes up the external ﬁnance premium, forcing entrepreneurs to reduce their demand for capital by
reducing investment. The fall in demand for capital is accompanied by a fall in demand for labour.
The asset price falls with the reduced demand for capital, and this further decreases entrepreneurs’
net worth (the ﬁnancial accelerator effect). Employment agencies post fewer vacancies due to the
14fall in the aggregate demand for labour. As a result, the probability of a worker ﬁnding a job
decreases and the unemployment rate rises.
5.4.2 Financial accelerator mechanism
Figure 3 shows how the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism ampliﬁes the ﬁnancial shock. For the
purpose of illustration, I consider two cases: one is the baseline economy ( = 0:19), and the other
an economy in which the ﬁnancial market is less frictional ( = 0:05).
After the shock, the initial responses of net worth and leverage ratio are similar for both cases;
however, given the higher value of ; the response of the risk premium is signiﬁcantly larger in the
baseline economy than in the alternative economy. The risk premium rises more in the baseline
model, leading to a larger decline in demand for capital. The asset price declines further, driving
net worth further down. The ampliﬁcation effect of the ﬁnancial accelerator is more signiﬁcant in
the baseline economy, leading to stronger responses by the other variables to the ﬁnancial shock.
This is not necessarily the case for a shock that is not from the ﬁnancial sector. For example,
Figure 4 shows that a negative technology shock has a similar impact on unemployment and vacan-
cies as a negative ﬁnancial shock: after the shock, unemployment rises and vacancies fall. However,
rather than amplifying the effect of the shock, as is seen with a ﬁnancial shock, the ﬁnancial acceler-
ator mechanism dampens the responses of the key variables. Compared to the alternative economy,
in the baseline economy ( = 0:19), in which external ﬁnance costs are more elastic with respect to
entrepreneurs’ balance-sheet positions, unemployment rises by less and vacancies decline by less.
This is because, after a negative technology shock, risk premium falls, reducing the external ﬁnance
costs that ﬁrms face. With the reduced cost, the responses of ﬁrms’ demand for capital and labour
are dampened. The higher the ; the more signiﬁcant the dampening effect. Thus, although the
technology shock is more persistent and volatile than the ﬁnancial shock, its impact on unemploy-
ment and vacancies is less persistent and less signiﬁcant due to the dampening effect of the ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism.
6 Robustness
As suggested in Zhang (2011), for the model to capture the labour market dynamics, the follow-
ing two features are essential: (i) a ﬁnancial shock is included in the model and ﬁnancial data are
included in the estimation; and (ii) a staggered wage contract. In what follows, I examine whether
this is the case for the Canadian economy.
6.1 Financial shock and ﬁnancial data
In this section I re-estimate the model, but without the ﬁnancial shock and without using the ﬁ-
nancial time series. Table 8 compares the results of this alternative model (the no ﬁnancial shock,
or NoFS, model) with the baseline model. Similar to Zhang (2011), although estimates of the be-
havioural parameters and the shock processes do not change much, there is a signiﬁcant decline
15in the estimated value of the elasticity of external ﬁnancing:  falls to 0.024 from 0.19. As sug-
gested in Zhang (2011), this signiﬁcant reduction might reﬂect the fact that it is important to include
ﬁnancial time series to identify ﬁnancial frictions.
Table 8: Comparison of Estimation Results: NoFS vs. Baseline
Structural parameters Shock process
NoFS Baseline NoFS Baseline
 0.024 0.195 z 0.851 0.864
 0.697 0.847 e 0.539 0.497
 0.651 0.569  0.793 0.877
 0.236 0.224 g 0.684 0.602
r 0.368 0.425  – 0.397
 1.776 1.75 z 0.57 0.58





I further explore how well the NoFS model is able to account for the overall volatility in the data
compared to the baseline model. Table 9 reports the results. Similar to the ﬁndings in Zhang (2011),
theNoFSmodelmatchesthedatapoorly. Inparticular, theNoFSmodelhasdifﬁcultiescapturingthe
fact that unemployment and vacancies are highly volatile in the Canadian labour market. Without
the ﬁnancial shock, the technology shock becomes the most important shock: it explains around
63 per cent of the variance of unemployment and vacancies, and 86 per cent of the variance of real
wages (Table 10).
Table 9: Relative Standard Deviations: Model vs. Data
y c i w v u rn  fc
Data 1 0.53 3.93 0.88 9.65 5.59 0.18 0.17 0.29
NoFS 1 1.33 4.17 0.81 3.24 2.54 0.21 0.22 0.11
Baseline 1 0.72 4.28 0.84 16.02 13.25 0.29 0.19 0.16
6.2 Staggered wage contracting
Zhang (2011) suggests that the interaction of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism with wage-setting
frictions is the key for the model to match the data; in this section I conduct a similar exercise. I
ﬁrst study a NoFS case but replace ~ b and  with the unconventional values used in Gertler, Sala
16Table 10: Variance Decomposition for Labour Market Variables
NoFS Baseline
Shocks Unemployment Vacancy Real wage Unemployment Vacancy Real wage
Technology 62.3 63.9 86.2 13.9 13.9 22.6
Monetary 8.7 8.8 3.4 2.1 2.2 3.3
Investment 22.4 21.5 3.8 50.1 49.7 41.4
Preference 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4
Government 6.1 5.4 6.1 3.1 3.1 2.7
Financial - - - 30.5 30.7 29.6
Table 11: Relative Standard Deviations: Model Comparison
y c i w v u rn  fc
Data 1 0.53 3.93 0.88 9.65 5.59 0.18 0.17 0.29
Baseline 1 0.72 4.28 0.84 16.02 13.25 0.29 0.19 0.16
NoFS 1 1.33 4.17 0.81 3.24 2.54 0.21 0.22 0.11
NoFS with high ~ b and  1 0.37 4.83 0.69 17.05 13.79 0.14 0.12 0.07
Baseline w/ ﬂexible wages 1 2.28 4.63 0.90 1.73 1.43 0.51 0.34 0.36
and Trigari (2008) (~ b = 0:73; and  = 0:9). I then examine a model that is essentially the baseline
model, but replace staggered wage contracting with period-by-period Nash bargaining ( = 0).
Table 11 shows that with ~ b = 0:73; and  = 0:9, the NoFS model generates a similar variability
in unemployment and vacancies as the baseline model. As suggested in Zhang (2011), these un-
conventional values might serve the same role in amplifying the responses in unemployment and
vacancies to shocks as the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism serves in the baseline model.
The last row of Table 11 shows that, although the external ﬁnance premium stays very elastic
( = 0:19), the ﬂexible wage case is not able to generate enough variability in unemployment
and vacancies, conﬁrming the ﬁndings of recent studies that the conventional search models cannot
account for the key cyclical movements of unemployment and vacancies in the labour market.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, I employ a model from Zhang (2011), in which both labour market and ﬁnancial
market frictions are explicitly modelled. I estimate this model using Canadian data from 1984Q2
to 2010Q4, and use the estimated model to assess the importance of ﬁnancial frictions and shocks
in driving movements in the labour market. As in Zhang (2011), I ﬁnd that, although the ﬁnancial
shock is neither persistent nor volatile, the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism ampliﬁes this ﬁnancial
shock and generates large ﬂuctuations in the labour market. Overall, around 30 per cent of the
variations in unemployment and vacancies in the Canadian labour market are explained by ﬁnancial
shocks. I also ﬁnd that ignoring ﬁnancial shocks and ﬁnancial data reduces the model’s explanatory
17power. In particular, the model without these ﬁnancial factors has difﬁculties matching the observed
volatilities of unemployment and vacancies for the Canadian economy.
Despite the similarities in results between this paper and Zhang (2011),12 this paper suggests
that there is a gap between Canada and the United States in terms of the magnitude of the effects
ﬁnancial shocks have on unemployment and vacancies: the impact of domestic ﬁnancial shocks in
Canada is somewhat smaller, at 30 per cent versus 37 per cent for the United States. Indeed, this
gap might even be larger if the model allows for a small open-economy structure, because ﬁnancial
conditions in other countries, especially the United States, are likely to contribute to the ﬂuctuations
in the Canadian labour market. If this is the case, part of the ﬂuctuations in the labour market
accounted for by the domestic ﬁnancial shocks might be due to the shocks that originate in the
international ﬁnancial market.13
It would be interesting for future research to extend the current model to a small open economy
and examine the impact on the Canadian labour market of shocks originating from the ﬁnancial
sector in the United States. Another interesting extension would be to study optimal monetary
policy design, since the model in this paper features both labour and ﬁnancial frictions. One possible
question could be whether and how policy-makers should take into account ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancial
(e.g., asset price) and labour (e.g., unemployment) markets when conducting monetary policy.
12This is largely because the model used in both papers is the same and the Canadian labour market has a similar
volatility to that in the United States.
13Dib, Mendicino and Zhang (2008) estimate a DSGE model with both international and domestic ﬁnancial shocks
using Canadian data. They show that international ﬁnancial shocks account for about 11 per cent of the ﬂuctuations in
GDP for the Canadian economy, and that other foreign shocks account for about 10 per cent.
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Appendix B: Log-Linearized System of Equations
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27 and w are solved from the following two steady-state conditions:
x = (p











lx) + (1   ) b
where




































Appendix D: Tables from Zhang (2011)
Table D1: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters: United States (Zhang 2011)
Prior Posterior distribution
distribution Mode Mean 5% 95%
Risk premium elasticity  gamma (0.05,0.02) 0.230 0.240 0.203 0.288
Calvo wage parameter  beta (0.67, 0.05) 0.810 0.806 0.777 0.833
Calvo price parameter  beta (0.67, 0.05) 0.538 0.530 0.470 0.590
Capital adj. cost parameter  norm (0.25, 0.05) 0.217 0.216 0.144 0.292
Taylor rule inertia r beta (0.75, 0.1) 0.275 0.292 0.213 0.372
Taylor rule inﬂation  gamma (1.5, 0.1) 1.675 1.685 1.562 1.782
Taylor rule output gap y norm (0.125, 0.15) -0.006 -0.007 -0.022 0.008
28Table D2: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Shock Parameters: United States (Zhang 2011)
Prior Posterior distribution
distribution Mode Mean 5% 95%
Panel A: Autoregressive parameters
Technology z beta (0.6,0.2) 0.896 0.891 0.867 0.914
Preference e beta (0.6,0.2) 0.598 0.591 0.471 0.709
Investment  beta (0.6,0.2) 0.834 0.813 0.741 0.882
Government g beta (0.6,0.2) 0.692 0.687 0.623 0.759
Financial  beta (0.6,0.2) 0.242 0.270 0.095 0.444
Panel B: Standard deviations
Technology z invg (0.005,2) 0.83 0.83 0.76 0.90
Monetary m invg (0.005,2) 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.38
Investment  invg (0.005,2) 1.66 1.57 0.98 1.99
Preference e invg (0.005,2) 1.03 1.06 0.96 1.15
Government g invg (0.005,2) 1.02 1.02 0.95 1.11
Financial  invg (0.005,2) 0.55 0.54 0.41 0.67
29